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Abstract
We study how European climate and energy policy targets affect
different member states and households of different income quintiles
within the member states. We find that renewable energy targets in
power generation, by reducing eu ets permit prices, may make net
permit exporters worse off and net permit importers better off. This
effect appears to dominate the efficiency cost of increasing the share
of energy provided by renewable energy sources in the countries that
adopt such targets. While an increase in prices for energy commodi-
ties, which is entailed by the policies in question, affects households in
low income quintiles the most, recycling revenues from climate policy
allows governments to compensate them for the losses. If renewable
targets reduce the revenues from ets permit auctions, member states
with large allocations of auctionable permits will lose some of the abil-
ity to do so.
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1 Introduction
The climate policy of the European Union (eu) has distributional conse-
quences across households, industries, and countries. In order for the eu
to be able to continue to pursue ambitious targets in climate policy, policy
implementation needs to keep these distributional consequences in check:
In order to facilitate unanimous agreement on targets, it must be avoided
that some, especially less affluent, member states bear disproportionately
big shares of the overall policy cost. And in order for countries to imple-
ment policies to meet their targets on the national level, political opposition
caused by an uneven distribution of the costs within the countries should be
avoided. Unevenly distributed impacts have to be expected as low-income
households usually spend a larger share of their income on energy services
when compared to wealthier households.
The eu’s policy design shows recognition of this problem by allocating
auction revenues from the European Emission Trading System (eu ets)
to member states base on their economic abilities. The eu’s rules further
encourage member states to use their allocated permit auction revenue for
counteracting unintended distributional impacts of climate policies (among
other recommended uses of the revenue).
This paper analyses the effectiveness of the eu’s distribution of permit
auction revenues in addressing existing distributional issues and analyses the
interaction of eu targets for renewable power generation with this redistri-
bution mechanism. We examine the costs and distributive effects of the eu’s
20 percent emission reduction target for the year 2020 across and within eu
member states. We apply the computable general equilibrium (cge) model
pace in order to examine costs and distributional effects across and within
eu member states under different policy scenarios. In order to allow an as-
sessment of effects within member states, the model disaggregates consumers
into five representative households (income quintiles) in each member state.
We examine the costs of the existing eu ets with and without additional
mandatory targets for renewable energy sources (res) in the power sector
at the national level. In addition, we examine the distributive effects of
an eu-wide carbon tax targeting the sectors which are not yet covered by
the eu ets. Since the resulting costs at the household level and across the
income distribution are contingent on the mode of revenue recycling (the
way tax and ets revenues are being returned to the economy by the member
states), we compare partial and full revenue recycling via the existing tax
and transfer schemes of the member states to a situation without revenue
recycling. In the latter case, all revenues are invested in projects which yield
a return in the far future, for instance non-market based climate mitigation
projects.
There is a large body of literature on the distributional effects of climate
policy. Most studies analysing expenditure patterns suggest that direct car-
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bon taxation will cause regressive effects if the prices of necessities, such as
electricity or space heating, are affected. In contrast, direct taxation of the
carbon content of transport fuels tends to be neutral or even progressive
(Sterner, 2012). But restricting the analysis to expenditure patterns ignores
important effects on the income side. Boccanfuso et al. (2011) emphasises
the importance of general equilibrium effects on the distributional effects
of climate policy in developing countries. If climate policy causes impor-
tant changes for factor income (land rents, capital income, labour income),
according to this argument, cge models are a valuable tool for keeping
track of these effects. Rausch et al. (2011) provide a cge analysis of a hy-
pothetical cap-and-trade scheme in the United States, assuming a carbon
price of approximately USD 20 per ton of CO2 equivalent. Rausch et al.
find a moderate and rather neutral incidence of the policy across the in-
come distribution after revenue recycling. In particular, they conclude that
“[ . . . ] progressivity on the sources [income] side is sufficiently strong to
offset regressivity on the uses [expenditure] side so that carbon pricing is
proportional” [p. 31]. This confirms the importance of general equilibrium
effects on income for analysing distributional effects of climate policy. cge
studies on the distributional effects of climate policy in developing countries
include O’Ryan et al. (2005, in Chile), Liang (2012, in China), Yusuf and Re-
sosudarmo (2008, in Indonesia), Gonzalez (2012, in Mexico), Corong (2008,
in the Philippines), and Alton et al. (2012, in South Africa). Most studies
find that regressive effects of climate policy have to be expected but can be
mitigated by means of revenue recycling (for instance lump-sum transfers).
Distributional effects of renewable energy standards in the United States
are examined in a cge model by Rausch and Mowers (2014). They find that
a renewable energy standard would be about four times more costly than a
‘comprehensive market-based carbon pricing policy’ [p. 582]. A renewable
energy standard would further cause regressive distributional effects [p. 574].
Since the policy does not raise revenues, options for mitigating distributional
effects through revenue recycling do not exist. Buddelmeyer et al. (2012)
combine a cge model with a microsimulation model to assess the impact
of carbon emission reductions by cap-and-trade in Australia. The authors
find a moderately progressive distribution of costs after revenue recycling
by lump-sum transfers. However, progressivity diminishes over the course of
time as recycled permit revenues eventually become too small to compensate
households in the second income quintile. We are not aware of a cge study
that analyses the distributional effect of European climate policy across
member states and we seem to be the first to analyse interactions between
the distribution of eu ets permit auction revenue and ancillary eu climate
policy targets.
We find that, in the absence of revenue recycling, observed distribu-
tional effects show regressive patterns within most eu member states. If
revenues are fully or partly recycled in accordance to existing tax and trans-
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fer schemes, the resulting patterns of distribution are progressive. In some
cases, the lowest income quintiles would even profit in absolute terms. Across
member states, most Eastern members will profit from climate policy tar-
gets, whether in the case of a cap on emissions alone or given ancillary
renewable energy targets. Ambitious targets for res in national power gen-
eration can have two different effects on the distribution of climate policy
cost. First, they increase the cost to countries that implement the res tar-
gets and at the same time reduce the demand of the power sector for ets
permits thus decreasing the effort required from other countries to meet the
ets cap. Second, this reduction in permit demand lowers the permit price
thus reducing the value of the shares of permit auction revenue allocated to
different member states. We find the latter effect to dominate the former,
if several net permit importing member states adopt ambitious res targets.
That is, a country will gain (lose) from the ancillary res targets if it has
a negative (positive) trade balance in the ets permit market almost irre-
spective of whether the country itself is subject to a binding res target or
not.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The model is pre-
sented in Section 2, including a data description, the procedure of disaggre-
gation of households along the quintiles of the income distribution, and the
policy scenarios. Results are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
Our study employs the pace model and extends it by splitting the eu mem-
ber states’ representative households into income quintiles. This section
gives an overview of the model, the data used for calibration, and the sce-
narios that were run. The model is described in more detail in Appendix A.
2.1 The PACE model
The pace model is a gtap-in-gams cge model1 with extensions that make
it suitable for the analysis of climate and energy policies at a global scale.
Besides the 28 member states of the eu, the model includes the world re-
gions China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, India, Canada, USA, Mexico,
Brazil, Russia, Austria and New Zealand, Rest of Annex I2, Rest of World.
In each region, representative households own (region specific) production
factors that are employed by the regional sectors for producing globally
traded commodities. Regional governments collect tax revenues, demand
government services, and make transfers to households. The introduction of
1See for example https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/about/data_models.asp
2That is Annex I to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(unfccc).
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five representative consumers per European member state is a crucial exten-
sion to the standard pace model made by this paper. The five representative
households represent income quintiles and both their expenditure and their
income are calibrated by using survey data from European member states.
The production factors owned by the representative households are la-
bour, capital, and resources (viz. the fossil fuels: crude oil, gas, and coal).
The representative households in each region consume their specific con-
sumption bundles and demand fixed amounts of the investment good. Labour
and capital are mobile between sectors within countries. Technology specific
capital for power generation is an exception to this and is in fixed supply.
Governments in each region levy taxes, issue subsidies, make transfers to
households, and demand fixed amounts of government services.
The factors owned by households are employed by industrial sectors to
produce sector specific outputs which are traded between regions and used
as intermediate inputs by other sectors and are also consumed by repre-
sentative agents. pace uses nested constant elasticity of substitution (ces)
production functions to represent production in different economic sectors,
trade, and final consumption. The standard production function (see also
Fig. 5 in the Appendix) combines the use of intermediates with a value
added–energy composite at the top level. The value added–energy compos-
ite combines a labour–capital nest with the energy composite. The latter
again combines electricity input with a coal–non-coal aggregate which again
is an aggregate of oil and gas consumption. In order to account for car-
bon taxation, all fossil fuel inputs to the energy composite are associated
with the amount of CO2 emitted by the burning of the fuels. This pro-
duction structure applies to all productive sectors (including production of
non-traded commodities for investment, government consumption, and pri-
vate consumption by households), except power generation and extraction
of fossil fuels.
In the case of power generation, the model distinguishes the five gen-
eration technologies ‘oil’, ‘gas’, ‘coal’, ‘renewable’, and ‘nuclear’. They all
produce the homogeneous good electricity which is traded at a common mar-
ket price. The production technologies differ in fuel and capital intensity,
each technology using its specific fossil fuel and capital type. The technolo-
gies combine non-capital inputs in fixed proportions and trade them off with
the technology specific capital stock. This trade-off happens at an elastic-
ity of substitution that allows for calibration of price elasticity of electricity
supply per technology (also see Fig. 6 in the Appendix). In the case of fossil
fuel extraction, the fuel specific resource is used together with non-resource
inputs in fixed proportions (extraction) and this composite can be traded off
against more of the non-resource inputs (exploration) at a positive elasticity
of substitution on the top level (see Fig. 7 in the Appendix).
Industry output produced in one region is thus either exported or sold on
the domestic market alongside with the imported version of the good. Both
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are traded off against each other according to the Armington assumption
(Armington, 1969), which results in a domestic market price index. The
imported version of the good is again an aggregate of the varieties that are
produced in other regions.
Taxes in pace are levied on production factors and final products. Coun-
tries levy tariffs on imports and subsidise exports. Carbon taxes (for meeting
emission targets outside the eu ets) and emission allowance expenses (al-
lowances are issued for sectors whose emissions are governed by the eu ets)
are both proportional to the amount of fossil fuels burned in the process
of energy generation. CO2 emission rights are in both cases modelled as
a commodity in fixed supply. Regarding emissions within the eu ets, the
market clearing price for such emission rights corresponds to the market
price of ets allowances. Outside the eu ets, the modelled market price for
emission rights corresponds to the CO2 tax that governments would have to
impose on emitters in order to efficiently meet their national targets. The
emission rights are owned by the national governments and revenues from
selling them are given to households via lump-sum transfers or are invested,
depending on the policy scenario. In scenarios where member states are
assumed to employ cost-efficient but non--revenue raising policies for emis-
sions reductions in non-ets sectors, this policy is modelled as a carbon tax
and the tax revenues from each sector and household are refunded through
differentiated subsidies on sectoral output and household consumption.
Besides this standard pace setup, additional mechanisms need to be
included in the model for adequately representing eu climate policy and
its distributional impacts for this study. First, some sectors governed by
the ets receive free emission allowances. While the option of selling the
received permits at market prices induces firms to abate at efficient levels,
the advantage of receiving free permits makes them more profitable, which
induces market entry until market prices correct for this effect. This en-
dogenous reduction is modelled by a subsidy on the industries output price
that is financed by the value of carbon permits that the industry received
for free.
Second, in some scenarios, a target for the share of power generation
from res in total electricity shall be reached by implementing a quota. To
meet the quota, the power sector, representing the operators of different
generation technologies, subsidises power from res. Thus, its subsidised
generation cost can compete with the generation cost of other technologies
even at the required high deployment rates of res. The additional costs of
this internal subsidy are financed with a markup on total power sales, which
is modelled as a sales tax.
Third, real government consumption is kept constant by the model by
adjusting lump-sum transfers from the government to the households.
Fourth, in order to keep track of revenues from auctioning permits in
the eu ets, the model needs to distinguish between the amount of emis-
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sion allowances that are allocated to sectors for free and the amount that is
auctioned. The revenue from auctioning permits is then distributed accord-
ing to a fixed set of shares among the governments of the member states.
In some scenarios, national governments are required to spend their rev-
enue from permit auctioning on investments which increases the demand for
commodities that are associated with investment.
2.2 Data
The data source for the calibration of pace originates from the Global Trade
Analysis Project (gtap) (Aguiar et al., 2012). Version 8.1 of the gtap
data base provides the model with input output structures for production
sectors as well as trade patterns.
In order to capture impacts of rising prices of energy commodities on
consumers with different levels of affluence in different countries, we disag-
gregate the representative household of each country into five households
that represent the income quintiles. We combine two sets of survey results
to split expenditures on the one and income on the other hand between
the quintiles. On the expenditure side, national expenditures for different
consumption goods have to be split into the expenditure of different income
quintiles. The resulting expenditures will be used to calibrate the nested ces
functions representing the quintiles’ consumption baskets. On the income
side, factor endowments and government transfers have to be realistically
distributed among quintiles in the benchmark. While endowments are fixed
quantities in the model, transfers are endogenously determined in the scenar-
ios. In these scenarios, changes from benchmark transfers will be distributed
among the quintiles in proportion to the initial benchmark transfers.
Expenditure of income quintiles
The model imitates information from Eurostat on the amount of overall con-
sumption and the share of the energy goods in overall consumption for each
quintile. It is worthwhile to note that we rely on household expenditures in
Purchasing Power Standard (pps) provided by Eurostat in order to make
consumption bundles comparable between member states when reporting
results. The household budget surveys of EUROSTAT (2014) provide ex-
penditures per household and per adult equivalent for five quintiles in all eu
member states for the year 2010.
National expenditure shares for energy goods in gtap do not necessarily
match expenditure shares found in the household surveys by Eurostat. We
focus on energy commodities and use Eurostat survey results to distribute
both total expenditures and expenditures for energy commodities realisti-
cally across quintiles. Total consumption expenditures of the representative
household in gtap are distributed among quintiles in proportion to per
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capita expenditures within the income quintiles defined by Eurostat house-
hold surveys. Similarly, expenditures on energy commodities according to
gtap are distributed among quintiles in proportion to per capita energy ex-
penditures according to surveys. Expenditures for non-energy commodities
are distributed in fixed (within member states) proportions among quintiles
so that expenditures for energy and non-energy commodities add up to total
expenditures.
Income of quintiles in PACE
On the income side, the pace model distinguishes between wage earnings,
rents on capital and resources, and net transfers from government to house-
holds which are not necessarily positive.
In order to split these revenue streams among income quintiles, the
Household Finance and Consumption Survey (hfcs) by the European Cen-
tral Bank (ecb) is consulted. The data are available for the following 15
members of the eurozone: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Spain, Fin-
land, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal,
Slovenia, and Slovakia. We group these countries into Western, Eastern,
and Southern Europe and assume that in the remaining eu member states,
factor incomes are distributed across households according to the European
area (viz. South, East, or West) that they belong to. Thus, of the member
states not included in the hfcs , Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, and Romania are included in the Eastern Eu-
ropean region. Croatia is part of Southern Europe. Denmark, Ireland,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom are included in Western Europe.
Income classes of the hfcs are split into the broad fields wages, capi-
tal income, pensions, and transfers. The pace model on the other hand,
distinguishes labour income, rents from capital, income from resources, and
transfers from the government to households or vice versa.
Transfers in gtap and the hfcs do not seem to have congruent meanings
(in the ecb surveys, transfers principally result in positive income, whereas
they can also have a net negative impact on households’ balance sheets in
gtap). The pace benchmark calibration uses total (national) transfers re-
gardless of their sign and distributes them among quintiles in proportion to
the always positive transfer revenue indicated by the hfcs. Thus, if national
governments transfer additional revenue from climate policies to households,
transfers to quintiles in pace change in proportion to benchmark transfers.
The implemented calibration guarantees that the benefits from these addi-
tional transfers going to different quintiles are distributed in proportion to
transfers in the ecb survey data.
From the remaining revenue flows of households in gtap, labour income
is identified with labour income in the hfcs survey, while capital and re-
source rents are identified with revenues from capital and pensions. This
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reflects the fact that capital rents in gtap by far exceed pure capital income
according to the hfcs and can be defended by acknowledging that pensions,
at least to some extent, constitute rents on earlier investments.
Factor income from labour and capital by each household has to make
up for household expenditures including savings and net transfers to the
government. The national income from labour and capital according to
gtap is then distributed among quintiles such that the shares of labour and
capital income in total factor income are ‘as close as possible’ to the numbers
given in the hfcs survey (closeness was measured in terms of the 8-norm,
which strongly reacts to the worst fit across households, regions, and factors;
see Appendix A.4 for details).
Sensitivity analysis with regard to pension revenues
When calibrating income data from the ecb’s hfcs to pace, pension income
in income surveys are associated with capital income according to gtap.
Thus, capital in the pace model was distributed between income quintiles
to match the distribution of capital and pension income according to the
income survey. The consequence is that if climate policy affects capital
revenue in the pace model, this effect will be passed on to pensioners.
As an alternative interpretation of pension revenues in the income survey,
we associate it with labour income in pace. Thus, labour income as given
by gtap is distributed across income quintiles pursuant to how labour and
pension income is distributed.
Projecting the benchmark to 2020
The benchmark social accounting matrixs (sams) given by gtap reflect the
global economy in 2004. In order to discuss future European climate and en-
ergy policy, the data are projected to 2020. For this purpose, national factor
endowments are inflated according to regional growth projections from the
European Commission’s reference scenario (Capros et al., 2013). To reflect
progress in energy efficiency, the energy consumption of production is also
reduced by exogenous factors and in line with the aforementioned reference
scenario. The various imbalances created by these changes are smoothed out
by letting the model solve for equilibrium after factor endowment adjust-
ments and after numerous intermediate changes to energy intensity. This
procedure leads to the desired baseline 2020 projection.
Only at this stage, we distribute household income and expenditures
among quintiles according to the above assumptions and according to data
of 2010. While the distribution of national income levels across member
states is updated according to eu projections about gross domestic product
(gdp) growth, the distribution of income within member states is left at
a 2010 level. We observe that changes between 2005 and 2010 in income
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distribution within member states are considerably more extensive than the
distributional changes effected by the policy scenarios described in the fol-
lowing. The assumption that distribution of expenditures across income
quintiles in 2020 will be the same as in 2010 is implausible, but we still
believe that we are able to give reasonable estimates of how policy choices
affect the distribution of policy cost across income groups within member
states.
2.3 Scenarios
No-policy scenario
The ‘no climate policy’ (NoPolicy) scenario assumes the absence of climate
policy. The model baseline is calibrated to the reference scenario by the Eu-
ropean Commission (Capros et al., 2013), which assumes a binding eu ets
cap and a corresponding eu ets allowance price. Therefore, the no-policy
scenario represents a deviation from that baseline that is endogenously de-
termined by the model by removing the cap. It can be argued that, similarly
to the eu ets sectors, non-ets sectors in the Commission’s reference sce-
nario also are subject to policy intervention and would behave differently
if such intervention was taken away. Our model is not able to take such
policies into account which makes the policy environment for the non-ets
sectors in the NoPolicy scenario and the calibrated baseline identical. Only
if emission targets are tightened beyond the reference scenario described
by Capros et al. (2013), (price based) policies for emission reductions in
non-ets sectors are incorporated in the model.
Emission target
The ‘cap for overall emissions’ (Cap) scenario assumes that the eu abides by
their targets for 2020 and reduces overall emissions by 20 percent compared
to 1990 levels. The emissions permitted under the target are distributed
among eu ets and non-ets sectors according to the baseline given in Capros
et al. (2013). The non-ets emissions are then distributed among member
states according to the same baseline. The eu ets emissions are divided
into those allowances which are freely allocated to sectors and those which
are auctioned. Emission intensive sectors that are on the so-called leakage
list in the pace model receive all required allowances for free. Other sectors
have to purchase an increasing share of allowances through auctions and
will be purchasing all their allowances by 2027. The initial share that is not
purchased through auctions, will be received through free allocation as well.
The model endogenously keeps track of the allowances that remain for
auctioning and distributes the revenues from the auctions across member
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states according to the rules set up in 2009/29/EC.3 The revenues from
these auctions are assumed to be used by the member states to compensate
households for parts of the policy cost. This is modelled by means of increas-
ing the lump-sum transfers from the governments to the different household
quintiles in proportion to the currently existing transfers according to ecb
data.
The scenario Cap assumes that the targets for greenhouse gas emissions
outside the eu ets sectors are met by the member states through efficient
(i.e, marginal cost of emission abatement is equalised across sectors and
households as well as across fuel types), but non--revenue raising regulatory
measures.
Renewable target
In the ‘quota for renewable energy sources in power generation’ (Cap+RES )
scenario, member states are assumed to set themselves the same emission
targets in and outside the eu ets system as in the aforementioned scenario
Cap. However, in addition to the emission target, several member states set
themselves targets for the share of power they generate from res. These
member states are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. Each of them increases the share of res
in power generation to 10 percent above baseline levels (Table 1). The
scenario Cap+RES assumes that these member states reach the target by
mandating a renewable quota that the power sector has to finance by raising
electricity prices. Thus, from the national governments’ point of view, the
renewable targets are revenue neutral.
Table 1: Renewable targets in 2020. The targets correspond to a 10 percent
increase from the renewable share under ‘current policies’ (but are capped
at 90 percent).
Country Target [%]
Belgium 28
Denmark 69
France 30
Germany 43
Luxembourg 43
Netherlands 35
Sweden 64
UK 45
3http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/docs/ia_
auctioning_final_en.pdf
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Investment of ETS auctioning revenues
The ‘invest ETS auctioning revenues’ (Invest) scenario again assumes the
emission targets of Cap, but unlike the latter, does not recycle revenues
from auctioning eu ets allowances by transferring them to households. In-
stead the Invest scenario assumes a rigid implementation of eu rules stating
that revenues from these allowance auctions have to be used for investments
in clean technologies. This increases the demand for investment goods but
leaves less money to be allocated to consumption by the various households.
In terms of current consumption, this policy scenario obviously reduces wel-
fare. The benefits that such investments are supposed to have in the future
are not captured by the pace model.
Renewable target with investment of ETS auctioning revenues
The ‘quota for renewable energy sources and invest ETS auctioning rev-
enues’ (Invest+RES ) scenario assumes the emission targets of Cap, the res
targets of Cap+RES , and that the decision to invest eu ets auctioning
revenues are according to Invest . In terms of revenue to the government,
the renewable target remains revenue neutral. The auctioning of eu ets
permits generates revenues that have to be invested in clean technologies,
and the taxation of carbon has to meet emission targets outside the eu ets
which creates revenues that are recycled by handing out lump-sum transfers
to the household quintiles.
Taxation of household emissions with emission target
Just as Cap, the ‘tax emissions cap for overall emissions’ (TaxCap) scenario
includes national targets for non-ETS emissions, but assumes that they are
reached by national carbon taxes. This generates additional revenue that
may be recycled. The part of the carbon tax revenue that is levied on
industrial fuel consumption is rebated to the industries in proportion to
sales volumes and the part levied on households is returned to them on a
lump-sum basis.
Taxation of household emissions with emission target and renew-
able target
Just as Cap+RES , the ‘tax emissions quota for renewable energy sources
in power generation’ (TaxCap+RES ) scenario includes national targets for
non-ETS emissions and shares for renewable power generation, but assumes
that they are reached by national carbon taxes. The additional revenues are
redistributed among industries and different households like in scenario ‘tax
emissions cap for overall emissions’ (TaxCap).
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3 Results
3.1 Distribution of costs across EU
Results at the member state level refer to the aggregated change in the con-
sumption budget of households within member states. Figure 1 depicts the
percentage change in the consumption budget relative to the no-policy case.
Detailed results for each member state are comprised in Tables 8–13 (col-
umn “overall”, scenario Cap and Cap+RES ) of Appendix B. A decrease of
consumption in aggregate is expected until 2020 for most eu member states
as a result of introducing the ets cap (scenario Cap). However, the decrease
in the consumption budget is moderate in most member states. Examples
are France (−0.09%), the United Kingdom (−0.09%), Germany (−0.13%),
Spain (−0.2%), and Italy (−0.41%). Countries with a more pronounced
reduction in the consumption budget include Greece (−1.09%), Denmark
(−0.66%), the Netherlands (−0.57%), and Poland (−0.54%). Many Eastern
member states are expected to benefit from eu climate policy. One reason
for this is the relatively generous allocation of eu allowances to Eastern
member states. Gains from the introduction of the ets cap are most pro-
nounced in Bulgaria (+0.99%), Romania (+0.97%), and Slovakia (0.84%).
The Czech Republic (+0.49%) and Hungary (+0.15%) are also expected to
benefit. This result illustrates that many Eastern member states are ac-
tually over-compensated as a result of the eu-wide allocation of emission
allowances.
If the ets cap is augmented by a renewable energy target (scenario
Cap+RES ), moderate changes in consumption budgets occur under the pro-
vision of a cost-efficient implementation of the res quota. The observed
changes in the consumption budget are small for most of the member states
and originate from changes in the ets allowance price as well as from changes
in associated costs and benefits from allowance trading. A positive effect of
the res quota is expected for Poland and Italy where total costs decrease un-
der res when compared to scenario Cap. Stronger negative effects caused by
the introduction of the res quota in addition to the ets cap are observed for
Bulgaria and Romania. Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are also
affected. For these countries, benefits under the additional res quota are
lower than in the situation without the res quota. As the only non-Eastern
member state, Denmark is expected to face a larger loss in the presence of
the res target (−1.02%) when compared to the ets only scenario (−0.66%).
Other Western eu member states, such as the United Kingdom, France, Bel-
gium, Sweden, the Netherland, and Austria, also face larger costs under the
additional res target, but the changes in costs are not very pronounced.
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Distribution of relative impacts across member states in 2020
Cap
Cap+RES
Figure 1: Relative policy cost by eu member state and scenario. Countries
are sorted in ascending order of non-policy consumption based on Eurostat
data. The width of the bars is proportional to the share of the population
of each member state.
13
3.2 Distribution of costs within member states
In order to assess distributive effects of eu climate policy within the member
states, the household consumption in each of the states is disaggregated into
five quintiles, according to the distribution of incomes, based on Eurostat
data. The distribution of burdens at the household level within member
states does not only depend on the overall expected costs, as depicted in
Figure 1, but also on the recycling of revenues. In the following, we discuss
the distributive impacts at the household level for three different assump-
tions about how much revenue is available for recycling: i) no recycling; ii)
recycling of ETS-revenues; iii) recycling of ETS and carbon tax revenues.
3.2.1 No revenue recycling
Large costs of climate policy at the household level are to be expected in
the absence of revenue recycling (scenarios Invest and Invest+RES ). The
situation is modelled in such way that all revenues are invested. While the
costs of these investments are incurred in the present, their benefits occur in
the future and thus, climate policy revenues do not benefit current private
consumption. While this scenario is not necessarily realistic, it allows an
examination of distributive patterns of climate policy under increased costs
but unchanged income and transfers to private households and may serve
as a reference for the comparison of alternative revenue recycling schemes.
Figure 2 depicts the results. All results are reported in Tables 8–13 (columns
“q1” to “q5”, scenario Invest and Invest+RES ) of Appendix B.
The distribution of costs differs between countries but also between the
quintiles of the income distribution. Overall, there is the trend of a regres-
sive incidence of climate policy in this scenario. There are large burdens in
the top income quintile relative to other quintiles of the income distribu-
tion in some member states, i.e. in Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Repub-
lic, and Poland. The observed inverted U-shaped pattern of incidence in
these member states indicates that the top income quintile accounts for the
largest burdens, but at least in the case of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and
Poland, households in the lowest income quintile will also face considerable
burdens. In most of the other member states, the largest burdens fall on
the lowest income quintile in the absence of revenue recycling, so that we
observe the trend of a regressive pattern of incidence in the scenario Invest .
In this scenario, all member states and households, as represented by the
quintiles of the income distribution, face a net loss of disposable income due
to the investment of revenues in future projects.
In the scenario Invest+RES , where revenues are invested in future proj-
ects while there is an additional res target, we observe a change in the costs
incurred by households. The additional res target has pronounced effects
in Bulgaria and Poland. In these countries, costs incurred by households
14
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Figure 2: Policy costs by member states and quintiles of the income distri-
bution in the absence of revenue recycling. Quintiles within member states
are sorted according to their no-policy income with dark red representing
the poorest quintile and green representing the richest.
under the additional res target are considerably lower when compared to
the scenario Invest . However, the general pattern of incidence remains un-
changed. Slovakia is the only country which is expected to face net gains
in the Invest+RES scenario. The upper two income deciles in Slovakia are
expected to benefit from this policy, meaning that their consumption budget
will increase.
3.2.2 Recycling of ETS auction revenues
In scenarios Cap and Cap+RES , we assume that member states recycle all
revenues generated by the ets via the pre-existing tax and transfer schemes.
The model achieves this by recycling revenues in proportion to the existing
transfer patterns, as give by the ecb’s hfcs.
Figure 3 shows that the resulting distributive pattern differs strongly
compared to the scenario without revenue recycling. Under revenue recy-
cling, we find a pronouncedly progressive pattern of incidence for the major-
ity of Eastern member states (i.e. Bulgaria, Romania, and the Czech Repub-
lic). Most of the households in Eastern member states would actually benefit
from such a recycling scheme, meaning that they are over-compensated and
15
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Figure 3: Policy costs by member states and quintiles of the income distri-
bution with revenue recycling via existing transfer schemes.
face an increase in their consumption budget. Poland is the only Eastern
member state in which the consumption budget of most of the households
is expected to decrease.
For many Western member states, a rather neutral distribution of costs
along the quintiles of the income distribution is observed after recycling
of ets revenues and costs are expected to be moderate. Exceptions are
Greece, Denmark, and Sweden, for which a moderately regressive pattern
is observed. Under revenue recycling, the total cost of climate policy can
be even negative for some households in larger Western member states.
Examples are Belgium and France in which the top income decile is expected
to face negative costs. In Germany, the lowest income decile is expected to
face negative costs from eu climate policy if eu ets auction revenues are
recycled.
The introduction of an res target in addition to the ets cap does not
make much difference with respect to the occurring costs at the household
level but costs tend to be larger in some Western member states. Examples
are Greece, Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands, where the res target
will have negative consequences for low income households. The res target
further tends to increase overall burdens in Denmark and Sweden. In some
Eastern member states, i.e. Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, and
16
Slovakia, the res target will decrease gains from eu climate policy, while
the progressive pattern of incidence is preserved.
3.2.3 Recycling of revenues from ETS auction and carbon taxes
The eu ets covers industrial installations across Europe, but several eco-
nomic sectors are not covered by the system. In the previous scenario, it
was assumed that non-ets emissions are reduced in a cost-efficient manner
by non--revenue raising policies of the member states. In this scenario, we
investigate the case of hypothetical revenue-raising national carbon taxes
in non-ets sectors. It is assumed that both revenues from eu ets auctions
and carbon taxation of non-commercial emitters (i.e. private households) are
recycled (scenarios TaxCap and TaxCap+RES ). Carbon tax revenues gen-
erated in non-ets industrial and commercial sectors are not redistributed
to households. Results are depicted in Figure 4 and are reported in detail
in Tables 8–13 of Appendix B.
The alternative tax and recycling regime leaves the progressive distribu-
tive pattern in Eastern member states mostly unchanged, while costs at
the household level are further decreased (or benefits increased) when com-
pared to the scenario Cap. Notable changes are observed for the majority
of Western member states where the observed distributive pattern becomes
more progressive. The distribution of burdens is now strongly progressive in
Greece, where the lowest incomes are expected to benefit from climate policy.
As opposed to the scenario Cap, a progressive pattern of incidence is also
observed for countries such as Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands now.
In many Western member states, households in the lowest income decile are
even over-compensated as a result of revenue recycling in this scenario. In
the present case, the lowest income quintile of Greece, the United Kingdom,
Spain, France, Finland, Germany, Belgium, and Austria will benefit. The
introduction of a res target in addition to the ets and the carbon tax again
causes an increase of costs and a simultaneous decrease of benefits, while
the overall progressive pattern remains unchanged.
The changes in distributional outcomes are attributable to changes in
revenues that is recycled to households. The additional money that becomes
available for this by using taxes to regulate household emissions is shown in
Table 2.
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
When calibrating income data from the ecb’s hfcs to pace, pension in-
come in the surveys is associated with capital income, according to the
gtap database. Thus, capital in the pace model was distributed between
the income quintiles to match the distribution of capital and pension income
in the hfcs. The consequence is that if climate policy affects capital rev-
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Table 2: Revenue from ets auction and carbon taxation in million EUR for
scenario Cap with an emission cap and scenario Cap+RES with a cap and
res targets.
TaxCap TaxCap+RES
tax ETS revenue tax ETS revenue
revenue (permit price: revenue (permit price:
22.05 EUR/tCO2) 12.19 EUR/tCO2)
AUT 540.5 313.9 544.7 171.0
BEL 855.3 572.4 891.5 311.8
BGR 53.9 683.1 53.9 372.1
HRV 213.4 108.9 213.2 59.3
CYP 121.7 60.0 122.8 32.7
CZE 129.5 1054.7 124.5 574.5
DNK 484.7 281.6 489.5 153.4
EST 17.1 205.4 16.6 111.9
FIN 302.2 376.2 303.5 204.9
FRA 3113.3 1234.7 3141.7 672.6
DEU 5331.0 4516.6 5641.1 2460.2
GRC 3025.2 782.4 3085.5 426.2
HUN 209.9 337.0 208.0 183.5
IRL 374.9 212.3 382.1 115.7
ITA 4491.4 2174.1 4583.6 1184.2
LVA 45.8 46.2 46.3 25.1
LTU 42.9 122.3 43.2 66.6
LUX 170.7 39.2 170.3 21.4
MLT 122.7 23.1 120.4 12.6
NLD 1132.0 757.0 1203.5 412.3
POL 469.3 2818.0 459.8 1535.0
PRT 507.6 397.0 510.6 216.2
ROU 317.4 1126.3 302.7 613.5
SVK 62.5 346.2 61.0 188.6
SVN 161.5 99.2 162.4 54.1
ESP 2091.8 1947.9 2097.2 1061.0
SWE 536.2 200.8 537.8 109.4
GBR 2695.7 2354.1 2904.1 1282.3
18
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Figure 4: Policy cost by member states and quintiles of the income distribu-
tion if carbon emissions of households are taxed and revenues recycled via
existing transfer schemes.
enues in the pace model, this effect will be passed on to pensioners. As an
alternative interpretation of pension revenues in the hfcs, we associate pen-
sions with labour income in pace. Thus, labour income as given by gtap
is distributed across income quintiles, pursuant to how labour and pension
income is distributed.
Results of the sensitivity analysis are reported in line Cap-pl of Tables 8–
13 of Appendix B. The results match the scenario Cap in which pensions
were associated with capital income. The results show that there are mi-
nor differences between the two approaches. We observe small changes in
disposable income which usually occur at the lower and upper end of the
income distribution. The largest deviation is observed for Denmark. Costs
are approximately 0.4 percentage points higher in the top income quintile
under scenario Cap-pl than under scenario Cap. Deviations of up to 0.2
percentage points in the lowest quintile and −0.2 percentage points in the
highest quintile are also observed for Bulgaria, Hungary, the Netherlands,
and Poland. Thus, the assumption that pensions are equivalent to labour
income tends to increase (decrease) costs in the lowest (highest) quintile of
the income distribution, while the overall results and distributive patterns
remain unchanged.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the costs and distributive effects of eu climate pol-
icy across and within eu member states until 2020, based on a computable
general equilibrium model with five representative households per member
state representing income quintiles. We consider three policy options. First,
the goal of reducing emissions by 20 percent until 2020 relative to 1990
levels may be approached by an emissions trading scheme (ets) and com-
plementary cost-efficient non--revenue raising policies at the member state
level. Second, the same goal may be reached by the eu ets and national
carbon taxes on non-ets emissions. Third, there exists the option of intro-
ducing ancillary renewable energy sources (res) targets in addition to the
aforementioned emission targets. Under all three options, the ets generates
revenue that is distributed among member states according to fixed shares
and may be used to counteract undesired distributions of policy costs within
member states.
Our results show that, at the member state level, many Eastern mem-
ber states are expected to benefit from eu climate policy due to generous
permit allocation. Poland is the only exception which is expected to suffer a
reduction in the aggregated consumption budget of private households. The
introduction of a res target in addition to the eu ets tends to decrease
benefits in Eastern member states and tends to increase costs in Western
member states. Exceptions are Poland, Italy, and Finland which are ex-
pected to incur lower aggregated costs, given the additional res target.
In the absence of revenue recycling, we observe distributive patterns
which tend to be regressive. This regressivity can be avoided in the majority
of member states if ets auction revenues are recycled via the existing tax
and transfer schemes of the member states. If the eu ets is not the only
source of revenue generated by eu climate policy but is also augmented
by national carbon taxes, regressive policy impacts can be avoided in all
member states.
Our results provide several policy-relevant insights. First, the generous
allocation of emissions allowances to Eastern member states reduces their
policy cost and provides sufficient revenues to counteract regressive impacts
on households in Eastern member states. Most Eastern member states may
effectively be over-compensated and are expected to benefit from eu cli-
mate policy. The existing tax and transfer schemes in different member
states provide a solid basis for counteracting regressive impacts of climate
policy by means of revenue recycling. Only for few member states are ets
auction revenues and current transfer schemes insufficient for counteracting
regressive impacts. These member states, if unable to find ways to optimise
their transfers schemes, may implement revenue raising climate policies for
reducing emissions outside the ets and thus achieve non-regressive impacts
across households. Second, the res targets impact the distribution of costs
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between the member states since they cause the ets allowance price to de-
crease. They weaken the distributive impact of allocating ets permit auc-
tion revenue across member states. Even though member states with res
targets incur extra costs, they still reap overall benefits due to the permit
price effects if they are net permit importers in the ets permit market.
Our analysis provides a credible prediction of how effectively the distri-
bution of ets auction revenue can protect low income member states and
households within them from excessive policy cost and reveals a hitherto un-
documented interaction between res targets and the effectiveness of this dis-
tribution of auction revenue. Yet, some limitations should be noted. First,
lacking good data on income distribution in member states outside the euro-
zone, we make strong assumptions about how countries outside the eurozone
can be compared with certain countries within the zone. Actual survey data
from all eu member states may improve the reliability of analyses such as
ours. Second, factors other than res targets may reduce ets permit prices.
Generally speaking, if permit prices turn out to be unexpectedly low, but
national emission targets remain expensive to achieve, member states may
have to resort to revenue raising policies outside the eu ets for financing
recycling mechanisms that counteract regressive impacts within countries.
And the effectiveness of distributing auction revenue among member states
is always diminished at low permit prices.
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A The PACE model in more detail
A.1 The PACE model
The pace model is a gtapingams cge model4 with extensions that make it
suitable for the analysis of climate and energy policies at a global scale. In
each region, representative households own (region specific) production fac-
tors that are employed by the regional sectors for producing globally traded
commodities. Regional governments that collect tax revenues, demand gov-
ernment services, and make transfers to households round off the picture.
The introduction of five representative consumers per European member
state is the crucial extension to the standard pace model made by this pa-
per. The five representative households represent income quintiles and both
their expenditure and their income are calibrated by using survey data from
European member states.
The production factors owned by the representative households are labour,
capital, and resources (viz. the fossil fuels crude oil, gas, and coal). Those
are priced at PEL, PEK , PRres (res=col, cru, gas). Labour and capital are
mobile between sectors within countries. Solely for power generation is cap-
ital technology specific and in fixed supply. The five technologies for power
generation are oil, gas, coal, renewables, and nuclear and the corresponding
types of fixed capital are priced at PRTtec (tec = oil, gas, coal, renewable,
nuclear). The five representative households in each region consume their
specific consumption bundles gC1 , . . . , gC5 and demand fixed amounts of the
investment good gI . Another agent in each region which represents the gov-
ernment levies taxes, issues subsidies, makes transfers to households, and
demands fixed amounts of government services gG.
The factors owned by households are employed by industrial sectors (see
Table 3 for an enumeration of sectors) to produce sector specific outputs5
which are traded between regions and used as intermediate inputs by other
sectors and are also consumed by representative agents.
pace uses nested ces production functions to represent production in
different economic sectors, trade, and final consumption. The standard pro-
duction function (see also Fig. 5 in the Appendix) combines the use of inter-
mediates (priced at PAr,i,g) with a value added–energy composite at the top
level. The value added–energy composite combines a labour–capital nest
with the energy composite. The latter again combines electricity (ele) input
with a col–(oil–gas) aggregate. In order to account for carbon taxation, all
fossil fuel inputs to the energy composite are associated with the amount of
CO2 emitted by the burning of the fuels. This production structure applies
to all productive sectors (including production of non-traded commodities
4See for example https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/about/data_models.asp
5Throughout the paper sectors and their specific commodity shall carry the same iden-
tifier i.
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Table 3: Sectors of the pace model. The last column lists the indices that
include the respective sector. Index g runs over all goods and consumption
bundles, i over traded goods, f over fossil fuels, res over resources, ets
over sectors covered by the eu ets, and nets sectors outside the ets. The
distinction between ets and nets is only relevant for eu member states.
Code Sector In indices
oil refined coal and coal products g, i, f, ets
gas natural gas products g, i, f, res, nets
omn mining and construction g, i, nets
ppp Paper-pulp-print g, i, ets
crp Chemical-Rubber-Plastic products g, i, ets
nmm Mineral products nec g, i, ets
i s Ferrous metals g, i, ets
nfm Metals nec g, i, ets
ele Electricity and heat g, i, nets
col Coal transformation g, i, f, res, nets
cru Crude Oil g, i, res, nets
mch Machinery and other manufacturing g, i, nets
faw Food agriculture wood g, i, nets
twl Textiles-wearing apparel-leather g, i, nets
trn Transport g, i, nets
ser Services g, i, nets
gI Investment g, nets
gG Government consumption g, nets
gC1 ,. . . ,gC5 Household consumption g, nets
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Table 4: Regions of the pace model.
EU non-EU
Code Region Code Region
Aut Austria Chn China
Bel Belgium Jap Japan
Bgr Bulgaria Kor South Korea
Hrv Croatia Idn Indonesia
Cyp Cyprus Ind India
Cze Czech Republic Can Canada
Dnk Denmark Usa USA
Est Estonia Mex Mexico
Fin Finland Bra Brazil
Fra France Rus Russia
Deu Germany Anz Australia and New Zealand
Grc Greece Rax Rest of Annex-I
Hun Hungary Row Rest of World
Irl Ireland
Ita Italy
Lva Latvia
Ltu Lithuania
Lux Luxembourg
Mlt Malta
Nld Netherlands
Pol Poland
Prt Portugal
Rou Romania
Svk Slovakia
Svn Slovenia
Esp Spain
Swe Sweden
Gbr United Kingdom
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Table 5: Production factors and commodities of the pace model.
Commodity Price Indices
Endowments PEr,e r = Aut, Bel, Bgr, Hrv,
Cyp, Cze, Dnk, Est, Fin,
Fra, Deu, Grc, Hun, Irl,
Ita, Lva, Ltu, Lux, Mlt,
Nld, Pol, Prt, Rou , Svk,
Svn, Esp, Swe, Gbr,
Chn, Jap, Kor, Idn, Ind,
Can, Usa, Mex, Bra, Rus,
Anz, Rax, Row
e = K,L
Specific capital PRTr,tec r, tec = oil, gas, coal,
renewable, nuclear
Resources PRr,res r, res = col, cru, gas
Purchased goods PAr,i,g r, i = oil, gas, omn, ppp
crp, nmm, i s, nfm, ele, col,
cru, mch, faw, twl, trn, ser
Imported goods PMr,i r, i
Output Pr,g r, g = oil, gas, omn, ppp
crp, nmm, i s, nfm, ele, col,
cru, mch, faw, twl, trn, ser,
gI , gG, gC1 , . . . , gC5
Int’l transport PT
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Table 6: Taxes and subsidies in the pace model. rto, rtf, rtfd, rtfi, rtxs,
and rtms are fix tax rates implied by sam data. GFSUB, XI, and PSI are
endogenously determined by the model.
Tax rate Taxed value Taxed sector Tax collector
rtor,g−GFSUBr,g Pr,g Yr,g 6=ele Government r
rtor,ele+XIr−PSItecr Pr,ele Ytecr,ele Government r
rtfr,g,K PEr,K Yr,g 6=ele Government r
rtfr,g,L PEr,L Y
(tec)
r,g Government r
rtfr,res,R PRr,res Yr,res Government r
rtfdr,i,g Pr,i Ar,i,g Government r
rtfir,i,g PMr,i Ar,i,g Government r
rtxsr′,r,i Pr′,i Mr,i Government r
′
rtmsr′,r,i · (1−rtxsr′,r,i) Pr′,i Mr,i Government r
rtmsr′,r,i PT
(a) Mr,i Government r
(a) International transportation priced at PT is required for the im-
porting activity Mr,i for transporting the commodity i from different
regions r′. The tax rate rtmsr′,r,i applies to the part of transportation
that is needed to import the good from region r′.
for investment gI , government consumption gG, and private consumption by
households of the different quintiles gC1 ,. . . , gC5), except power generation
and extraction of fossil fuels. In the case of power generation, the model
distinguishes the five generation technologies oil, gas, coal, renewable, and
nuclear. Each of them provides the homogeneous good that represents elec-
tricity services and that is traded at price Pr,ele. The production technologies
differ in fuel and capital intensity, each technology using its specific fossil
fuel and capital type. The technologies combine non-capital inputs in fixed
proportions (according to a Leontief production function) and trade them
off with the technology specific capital stock. This trade-off happens at an
elasticity of substitution that allows for calibration of price elasticity of elec-
tricity supply per technology (also see Fig. 6 in the Appendix). In the case
of fossil fuel extraction, the fuel specific resource priced at PRr,res is used
together with non-resource inputs in fixed proportions (extraction) and this
composite can be traded off against more of the non-resource inputs (explo-
ration) at a positive elasticity of substitution on the top level (see Fig. 7 in
the Appendix).
The output of industry i thus produced in region r (priced at Pr,i) is
then either exported or sold to sector/agent g6 on the domestic market,
alongside with the imported version of the good (priced at PMr,i). Both
6Index g runs over both industries i and agents gC1 , gC5 , gG, gI that are identified
with the same index as the commodity they consume
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are traded off against each other according to the Armington assumption,
which results in a domestic market price index PAr,i,g (display a of Fig. 8).
The imported version of the good is again an aggregate of the varieties
that are produced in other regions. They reach the market of region r by
using international transport services (priced at PT), which are provided
from domestic transport services according to a Cobb-Douglas production
function (displays b and c of Fig. 8).
Taxes in pace are levied on production factors and final products. Coun-
tries levy tariffs on imports and subsidise exports. Carbon taxes (for meeting
emission targets outside the eu ets) and emission allowance expenses (al-
lowances are issued for sectors whose emissions are governed by the eu ets)
are both proportional to the amount of fossil fuels burned in the process
of energy generation. CO2 emission rights are in both cases modelled as
a commodity in fixed supply. Regarding emissions within the eu ets, the
market clearing price for such emission rights (the model prices them at
PCets) corresponds to the market price of ets allowances. Outside the eu
ets, the modelled market price (PCnetsr ) for emission rights corresponds to
the CO2 tax that governments would have to impose on emitters in order
to efficiently meet their national targets. The emission rights are owned
by the national governments, and revenues from selling them are given to
households via lump-sum transfers or are invested, depending on the policy
scenario.
pace is implemented as a mixed complementarity program (mcp) using
mps/ge. As such, it consists of a set of equations with each equation com-
plementing exactly one variable of the model. The mcp framework implies
that, at a solution, equations may be violated such that the left-hand sides
are bigger (smaller) than the right-hand sides if their complementary vari-
ables are at their lower (upper) bounds. The standard set of equations in
cge models consists of
• zero-profit conditions (cost ≥ revenue) for each sector (thus determin-
ing the non-negative activity level of the sector),
• market clearing conditions (supply ≥ demand) for each commodity
(thus determining the non-negative market price of the commodity),
and
• budget balance conditions (spending = income) for each representative
agent (thus determining the consumption expenditure by that repre-
sentative agent).
In order to derive the aforementioned equations from production structures,
the model assumes that inputs are chosen such that production costs are
minimised. When producers take market prices of inputs as given, unit
factor demand and unit production cost can be derived in closed form from
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the nested ces production functions. Thus, zero-profit conditions can be
constructed by using unit production cost. In addition, unit factor demand
multiplied by sectoral activity gives sectoral factor demand, which is needed
to formulate market balance equations (and via the tax channel into income
balance of governments). Appendix A.2 provides more detailed information
on this.
Besides the aforementioned standard equations, additional equations are
needed to determine the output subsidy GFSUBr,ets for sectors ets that re-
ceive free allowances in the ets. The subsidy for sector ets is set in such a
way that the value of the subsidy, which flows into the sector, cancels the ex-
penditure that the sector incurs for the permits it should receive freely. This
has the two desired effects that, on the one hand side, cost minimising fuel
demand of sectors includes permit cost and thus reflects the opportunity cost
of holding carbon permits for own use, and, on the other hand, sectors do
not pass on permit cost to consumers. This corresponds to the assumption
that under perfect competition windfall profits from freely allocated per-
mits will make firms enter the sector until market prices for the produced
commodity have dropped to a level where profits correspond to the average
regional returns on capital. In stylised form, the equation complementary
to the positive variable GFSUBr,ets is
GFSUBr,ets · revenuer,ets ≥ freeshareets · permit-expenditurer,ets.
freeshareets is a sector specific share of allowances that is allocated to the
sector ets for free and ‘revenuer,ets’ and ‘permit-expenditurer,ets’ are endoge-
nously determined by the model.
In some scenarios, a target for the share of power generation from res
in total electricity shall be reached by implementing a quota. To meet
the quota, the power sector, representing the operators of different genera-
tion technologies, subsidises power from res with the rate PSIr. Thus, its
subsidised generation cost can compete with the generation cost of other
technologies even at the required high deployment rates of res. The ad-
ditional costs are financed with share XIr of total power sales, which is
modelled as an internally raised sales tax rate XIr. The stylised equations
complementary to the two positive variables PSIr and XIr are
power supplyr,renewables ≥ rensharer ·
∑
tec
power supplyr,tec
and
XIr ·
∑
tec
power salesr,tec ≥ PSIr · generation costr,renewables.
The parameter rensharer is given by the policy scenario, and ‘power supplyr,tec’,
‘power salesr,tec’, and ‘generation costr,tec’ are endogenously determined by
the model.
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Real government consumption of good gG is kept constant by the model.
Lump-sum transfers from the government to the households are adjusted by
the unconstrained variable RTAXr in the case of a budget surplus or deficit
to solve
Y¯r,gG = Yr,gG .
In order to keep track of revenues from auctioning permits in the eu ets,
the model needs to distinguish between the amount of emission allowances
allocated to sectors for free (FREEEUASr) within region r and those that
are auctioned (AUCTEUASr) by the government r. The two equations that
are complementary to these positive variables are
FREEEUASr ≥
∑
ets
freeshareets · permit-demandr,ets,
AUCTEUASr ≥ auctsharer · (etscap−
∑
r
FREEEUASr),
where ‘etscap’, ‘freeshareets’, and ‘auctsharer’ are exogenous parameters and
‘permit-demandr,ets’ is endogenously determined by the model. ‘etscap’ is
the European ets cap and ‘auctsharer’ shares the revenue of permit auc-
tioning among member states r (
∑
rauctsharer = 1).
In some scenarios, national governments are required to spend their rev-
enue from permit auctioning on investments. In that case, the positive
variable INVDEMr denotes the additional demand for the investment good
gI that is caused by this. It is complementary to the equation
INVDEMr ≥ PCets ·AUCTEUASr.
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A.2 Structure of production and trade in the PACE model
The pace model employs nested production functions depicted in Figure 5,
where each node represents a ces nest with the child nodes as inputs and
the associated σnode as the elasticities of substitution governing the ces nest
‘node’. The appendix illustrates how such trees correspond to nested ces
production functions and how unit expenditure functions and unit factor
demand functions are derived.
Activity Yr,g (g 6= ele, g 6= res):
Pr,g
σTOPg
KLE
σKLEg
VA
σVAg
PEr,K PEr,L
Energy
σENEg
PAr,ele,g non-ELEσNELg
Coal
σ = 0
PAr,col,g PCr
non-coal
σNCOLg
Oil
σ = 0
PAr,oil,g PCr
Gas
σ = 0
PAr,gas,g PCr
Intermediates
σINTg
PAr,oil,g . . . PAr,ser,g
Figure 5: Production of commodity g in region r for all g other than elec-
tricity (g=ele) and resources (g=col, cru, gas). The Intermediates nest does
not use commodities i=ele, col, gas, as these enter the Energy nest exclu-
sively. The commodity i=oil only enters the Intermediates nest with positive
quantities in the case of oil refineries g=oil.
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Activity Ytecr,ele:
Pr,ele
σELEr,tec
PRTr,tec Variable factors
σ = 0
Non-fuel
σ = 0
PEr,L PAr,omn,g . . . PAr,ser,g
Fueltec
σ = 0
PAr,ftec,g PCr
Figure 6: Power generation by technology ‘tec’. Capital used in power
generation is modelled as a technology specific factor priced at PRTr,tec
that is not mobile across sectors. The variable factors include technology
specific fuels ftec (foil=oil, fgas=gas, fcoal=col) on the one hand, and non-
fuel variable inputs on the other. Non-fuel variable inputs are used in the
same fixed proportions for all power generation technologies.
Activity Yr,res:
Pr,res
σRESr,res
PINPr,res Fix factor
σ = 0
PINPr,res PRr,res
PINPr,res
σ = 0
PEr,L PEr,K i=oil
σ = 0
PAr,oil,g PCr
. . . i=ser
PAr,ser,g
Figure 7: Production function for extraction of resources res priced at Pr,res.
Production inputs are used in fixed proportions to produce an intermediary
good PINPr,res. Some of the PINPr,res is employed in fixed proportion
with the resource capacity PRr,res itself, the rest enters production at the
top-level nest which allows some degree of substitution between production
efforts and resource availability.
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(a) Activity Ar,i,g:
PAr,i,g
σARMr,i
Pr,i PMr,i
(b) Activity Mr,i:
PMr,i
σIMPr,i
Imports AUT
σ = 0
Pr′=AUT,i PT
. . . Imports ROW
σ = 0
Pr′=ROW,i PT
(c) Activity YT:
PT
σ = 1
Pr′=AUT,trn . . . Pr′=ROW,trn
Figure 8: Armington aggregate and imports. Traded commodities i are
purchased by production sectors and consumers in region r at price PAr,i,g.
This price is the result of trade-off between the domestically produced ver-
sion of the good priced at Pr,i, and the imported version priced at PMr,i.
The price of the imported version of the good is the result of trading off im-
ports from different trade partners r′ (r′ = AUT, . . . ,ROW) priced at Pr′,i.
Additionally, importing from one region to another requires fixed amounts
of international transport services priced at PT and provided by activity
YT.
33
A.3 From nested CES functions to model equations
Let the ces production function
Yˆ =
[
k∑
i=1
θi
(
Iˆi
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
describe the production of Y from inputs Ii (i = 1, . . . , k) if Vˆ denotes the
value of a variable V relative to its benchmark value V¯ to which the ces pro-
duction function is calibrated. Given benchmark inputs I¯i and benchmark
prices P¯Ii , θi shall denote the value share of good i in benchmark production
θi =
I¯iP¯Ii∑k
j=1 I¯jP¯Ij
.
In analogy to the following, this guarantees that benchmark input quantities
correspond to cost minimising input demand for production at benchmark
prices P¯i. Then, if prices of Ii are PIi , minimised unit production cost can
be shown to be
eˆ(PI1 , . . . , PIk) =
[
k∑
i=1
θi
(
PˆIi
)1−σ] 11−σ
.
If the zero profit condition is met, and the market price of commodity Y ,
PY , equals unit expenditure (PˆY = eˆ), the price minimising unit demand
can be written as
di(PI1 , . . . , PIk) =
∂e(PI1 , . . . , PIk)
∂Pi
=
e¯θi
P¯Ii
(
eˆ(PI1 , . . . , PIk)
PˆIi
)σ
. (1)
In the special cases σ = 1 and σ = 0, the production function takes the
forms
Yˆ =
k∏
i=1
(
Iˆi
)θi
σ = 1
Yˆ =
k
min
i=1
(
Iˆi
)
σ = 0
and the minimised unit production cost is
eˆ(P1, . . . , Pk) =
k∏
i=1
(
PˆIi
)θi
σ = 1
eˆ(P1, . . . , Pk) =
k∑
i=1
θiPˆIi σ = 0.
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The following equations illustrate how the nested ces tree in Figure 5
corresponds to ces production functions and how taxes in Table 6 of the
paper enter the corresponding unit cost and demand functions. In order to
keep track of cost of sub-nests, internal prices are introduced and pNEST shall
denote the unit cost of sub-nest NEST. The zero-profit conditions which are
complementary to Yr,g and relate the market prices Pr,g with the input
prices PAr,i,g, PEr,K, PEr,L, the carbon prices PC
nets
r and PC
ets, and the
sub-nest costs pKLE,r,g, pVA,r,g, pENE,r,g, pNEL,r,g, pNCOL,r,g and pINT,r,g are
Pˆr,g [1− rtor,g + GFSUBr,g] ̂
≤
[
θKLEr,g (pˆKLE,r,g)
1−σTOPg + θINTr,g (pˆINT,r,g)
1−σTOPg
] 1
1−σTOPg
pˆINT,r,g =
[∑
i
θiINT,r,g
(
PˆAr,i,g
)1−σINTg ] 11−σINTg
pˆKLE,r,g =
[
θVAKLE,r,g (pˆVA,r,g)
1−σKLEg + θENEKLE,r,g (pˆENE,r,g)
1−σKLEg
] 1
1−σKLEg
pˆVA,r,g =
[
θKVA,r,g
(
PˆEr,K[1 + rtfr,g,K]̂)1−σVAg
+θLVA,r,g
(
PˆEr,L[1 + rtfr,g,L]̂)1−σVAg ] 11−σVAg
pˆENE,r,g =
[
θeleENE,r,g
(
PˆAr,ele,g
)1−σENEg
+ θNELENE,r,g (pˆr,NEL)
1−σENEg
] 1
1−σENEg
pˆNEL,r,g =
[
θcolNEL,r,g
([
PAr,col,g + ξr,col,gPC
ets/nets
r
] ̂)1−σNELg
+θNCOLNEL,r,g (pˆr,NCOL)
1−σNELg
] 1
1−σNELg
pˆNCOL,r,g =
[
θoilNCOL,r,g
([
PAr,oil,g + ξr,oil,gPC
ets/nets
r
] ̂)1−σNCOLg
+θgasNCOL,r,g
([
PAr,gas,g + ξr,gas,gPC
ets/nets
r
] ̂)1−σNCOLg ] 11−σNCOLg ,
where ξr,i,g are the emission coefficients of inputs i to production process
g and θINPUTNEST are the value shares of INPUT in nest NEST such that the
shares of inputs within a nest add up to one. The emission coefficients are
calculated by dividing the benchmark emissions caused by the burning of
the input by the benchmark value of inputs i to g.
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If supply of the good priced at Pr,g by sector g in region r is Sr,g, demands
dINT,r,g and dKLE,r,g for the INT and KLE nest outputs are determined by
dˆINT,r,g = Sˆr,g
(
Pˆr,g [1− rtor,g + GFSUBr,g] ̂
pˆINT,r,g
)σTOPg
dˆKLE,r,g = Sˆr,g
(
Pˆr,g [1− rtor,g + GFSUBr,g] ̂
pˆKLE,r,g
)σTOPg
.
From this, demand DAr,i,g for the intermediate good priced at PAr,i,g by the
INT nest is derived as
DˆAr,i,g;INT = dˆINT,r,g
(
pˆINT,r,g
PAr,i,g
)σINTg
= Sˆr,g
(
Pˆr,g [1− rtor,g + GFSUBr,g] ̂
pˆINT,r,g
)σTOPg (
pˆINT,r,g
PˆAr,i,g
)σINTg
,
and in analogy, demand for labour and capital by sector g in region r is
given by
DˆEL/K,r;g =Sˆr,g
(
Pˆr,g [1− rtor,g + GFSUBr,g] ̂
pˆKLE,r,g
)σTOPg (
pˆKLE,r,g
pˆVA,r,g
)σKLEg
·
(
pˆVA,r,g
PˆEr,L/K[1 + rtfr,g,L/K]̂
)σVAg
.
Demands for coal (DAr,col,g;ENE) as an energy input and for emission permits
associated with coal (DCr;col,g) use are
DˆAr,col,g;ENE = Sˆr,g
(
Pˆr,g [1− rtor,g + GFSUBr,g] ̂
pˆKLE,r,g
)σTOPg (
pˆKLE,r,g
pˆENE,r,g
)σKLEg
·
(
pˆENE,r,g
pˆNEL,r,g
)σENEg  pˆNEL,r,g[
PAr,col,g + ξr,col,gPC
ets/nets
r
] ̂
σNELg
DˆCr;col,g = DˆAr,col,g;ENE.
Demand for other commodities by all sectors is derived in analogy to the
above following the demand structures given in Figures 5–8. Table 7 gives
an overview as to which activities supply and demand which commodities
in pace. Market clearance conditions follow directly.
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Table 7: Overview over demand and supply of commodities
Price Supply (proportional to) Demand (proportional to)
Pr,i S
(tec)
r,i (Y
(tec)
r,i ) Dr,i;A (Ar,i,g)
Dr,i;M,s (Ms,i)
Dr,i=trn;Y T (YT)
Pr,gC1...5 Sr,gC1...5 (Yr,gC1...5 ) Dr,gC1...5
(
HHr,C1...5
Pr,gC1...5
)
Pr,gI Sr,gI (Yr,gI ) Dr,gI
Pr,gG Sr,gG (Yr,gG) Dr,gG
(
GOVTr
Pr,gG
)
PEr,L/K SEr,L/K DEr,L/K;i (Y
(tec)
r,i )
PRTr,tec SRTr,tec DRTr,tec (Y
tec
r,ele)
PRr,res SRr,res DRr,res (Yr,res)
PAr,i,g SAr,i,g (Ar,i,g) DAr,i,g;INT (Yr,g)
DAr,i,g;ENE (Yr,g)
PMr,i SMr,i (Mr,i) DMr,i;g (Ar,i,g)
PT ST (YT) DTr,i (Mr,i)
PCnetsr SCr DCr;f,nets (Yr,nets)
PCetsr
∑
r (AUCTEUASr DCr;f,ets (Yr,ets)
+FREEEUASr)
Income balance equations have to hold for the government and each
income quintile per regions:
GOVTr = PC
nets
r SCr + PC
ets
r AUCTEUASr − RTAXr
+ PCetsr FREEEUASr −
∑
i
GFSUBr,iPr,iSr,i
+
∑
i
rtor,iPr,iSr,i +
∑
i,r′
rtxsr,r′,iPr,iDr,i;M,r′
+
∑
i,r′
rtmsr′,r,i
[
(1− rtxsr′,r,i)Pr′,iDr′,i;M,r + PT ·DTr,i
]
+
+
∑
i,e
rtfr,i,ePEr,eDEr,e;i +
∑
res
rtfr,res,RPRr,resDRr,res
+
∑
i,g
rtfdr,i,gPr,iDr,i;A +
∑
i,g
rtfir,i,gPMr,iDMr,i;g
HHr,Cq = κr,q
[
PEr,KSEr,K +
∑
tec
PRTr,tecSRTr,tec +
∑
res
PRr,resSRr,res
]
+ λr,qPEr,LSEr,L − κr,qPr,gIDr,gI + τr,qRTAXr q = 1, . . . , 5.
37
A.4 Data
The data source for the calibration of pace originates from the gtap (Aguiar
et al., 2012). Version 8.1 of the gtap data base provides the model with
input output structures for production sectors as well as trade patterns.
In order to capture impacts of rising prices of energy commodities on
consumers with different levels of affluence in different countries, we disag-
gregate the representative household of each country into five households
that represent the income quintiles. We combine two sets of survey results
to split expenditures on the one and income on the other hand between
the quintiles. On the expenditure side, national expenditures for different
consumption goods have to be split into the expenditure of different income
quintiles q = 1, . . . , 5. The resulting expenditures will be used to calibrate
the nested ces functions representing the consumption activities YgCq which
yield the final consumption baskets denoted by commodities gC1 ,. . . ,gC5 . On
the income side, factor endowments and government transfers have to be re-
alistically distributed among quintiles in the benchmark. While endowments
are fixed quantities in the model, transfers are endogenously determined in
the scenarios. In these scenarios, changes from benchmark transfers will
be distributed among the quintiles in proportion to the initial benchmark
transfers.
Expenditure of income quintiles
The model imitates information from Eurostat on the amount of overall
consumption and the share of the energy goods in overall consumption for
each quintile. It is worthwhile to note that we rely on household expendi-
tures in pps provided by Eurostat in order to make consumption bundles
comparable between member states when reporting results. The household
budget surveys of EUROSTAT (2014) provide expenditures per household
and per adult equivalent for five quintiles in all eu member states for the
year 2010. Also on the quintile level, consumption is split into different
broad consumer good categories at the tow-digit level of the Classification
of Individual Consumption According to Purpose (coicop). On the na-
tional level, Eurostat splits consumption into more detailed consumer good
categories which makes it possible to identify the consumption of the energy
goods electricity, liquid fuels for heating and transportation, gas, and coal.
In order to distribute consumption of energy good ii among quintiles,
its share in national consumption of the two-digit category i containing ii
is used to split each quintile’s consumption of category i into its parts. Call
σnationalii,tot the share of ii consumption in total expenditures at the national
level. Similarly, σqi,tot is defined as the share of i consumption in total ex-
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penditures of quintile q. With these two definitions given by Eurostat, we
compute the shares
σnationalii,i = σ
national
ii,tot /σ
national
i,tot
for energy goods ii contained in categories i, and guess the share of good ii
consumption in total expenditure of quintile q to be
σqii,tot = σ
q
i,totσ
national
ii,i .
The Eurostat tables provide numbers for the years 2010, 2005, 1999, and
previous ones. Unavailable entries for 2005 and 2010 were imputed from
1999 or 2005 entries. This was done either by scaling them according to the
next higher category which was available, or otherwise by assuming a growth
of consumption according to the national growth of gdp across quintiles and
categories.
Expenditure shares for energy goods in gtap do not necessarily match
expenditure shares found in the household surveys by Eurostat. We focus on
energy commodities and use Eurostat survey results to distribute both total
expenditures and expenditures for energy commodities realistically across
quintiles. Total consumption expenditures of the representative household
in gtap are distributed among quintiles according to expenditure per house-
hold divided by the estimated household size7 within the income quintiles
defined by Eurostat household surveys. The expenditures on energy com-
modities ii is split across quintiles in proportion to
σqii,totε
q∑
q′ σ
q′
ii,totε
q′
,
7 By comparing household expenditures per adult equivalent with household expen-
ditures per household, we infer the number of adult equivalents per household in each
quintile. Adult equivalents as a measure of household size are computed by counting the
head of a household with weight 1 and adding 0.5 for each additional adult and 0.3 for
each additional child in the same household. In the extreme case in which all members of
all households are adults, the average household size n is
n = 1 +
ae− 1
0.5
,
if ae denotes the average number of adult equivalents per household. In the other extreme
case in which all households consist of one adult plus children,
n = 1 +
ae− 1
0.3
.
An intermediate estimator for the household size that fits the national average household
size across countries relatively well is
n = 1 + 2.3(ae− 1).
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where εq denote total expenditures of households within quintiles. Expendi-
tures for non-energy commodities are distributed in fixed proportions among
quintiles so that expenditures for energy and non-energy commodities add
up to total expenditures.
Income of quintiles in PACE
On the income side, the pace model distinguishes between wage earnings,
rents on capital and resources, and net transfers from government to house-
holds which are not necessarily positive.
In order to split these revenue streams among income quintiles, the hfcs
by the ecb is consulted. The data are available for the following 15 mem-
bers of the eurozone: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Spain, Finland,
France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia,
and Slovakia. We group these countries into Western, Eastern, and South-
ern Europe and assume that in the remaining eu member states, factor
incomes are distributed across households according to the European area
(viz. South, East, or West) that they belong to. Thus, of the member
states not included in the hfcs , Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, and Romania are included in the Eastern Eu-
ropean region. Croatia is part of Southern Europe. Denmark, Ireland,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom are included in Western Europe.
Income classes of the hfcs are split into the broad fields wages, capi-
tal income, pensions, and transfers. The pace model on the other hand,
distinguishes labour income, rents from capital, income from resources, and
transfers from the government to households or vice versa.
Transfers in gtap and the hfcs don’t seem to have congruent meanings
(in the ecb surveys, transfers principally result in positive income, whereas
they can also have a negative impact on households’ balance sheets in gtap).
The pace benchmark calibration uses total (national) transfers regardless
of their sign and distributes them among quintiles q in proportion to the
always positive transfer revenue indicated by the hfcs with shares τr,q.
8
From the remaining revenue flows of households in gtap, labour income
is identified with labour income in the hfcs survey, while capital and re-
source rents are identified with revenues from capital and pensions. This
reflects the fact that capital rents in gtap by far exceed pure capital income
according to the hfcs and can be defended by acknowledging that pensions,
at least to some extent, constitute rents on earlier investments.
Shares κr,q of the national revenue K¯r from capital and resources avail-
able according to gtap are attributed to the income quintiles q = 1, . . . , 5
8 If national governments transfer additional revenue from climate policies to house-
holds, transfers to quintiles in pace change in proportion to benchmark transfers. The
implemented calibration guarantees that the benefits from these additional transfers going
to different quintiles are distributed in proportion to transfers in the ecb survey data.
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and similarly, national wage earnings L¯r are distributed according to shares
λr,q. The revenues from the respective shares of K¯r and L¯r have to add up
to the income quintiles’ factor income FIr,q. For our purpose, this factor
income is the residual between the income quintiles’ expenditure and the
benchmark government transfers allocated to them as described above. In
order to achieve a good match between the shares of capital or labour income
in any quintile’s average household income in the pace calibration and the
shares of capital-plus-pension income (cpisr,q) or labour income (lisr,q) in
any quintiles average household income according to the hfcs, the following
optimisation was evaluated
min
κr,1,...,κr,5,λr,1,...,λr,5
∑
r,q
[(
κr,qK¯r
FIr,q
− cpisr,q
)8
+
(
λr,qL¯r
FIr,q
− lisr,q
)8]
s.t. 1 =
∑
q
κr,q ∀r
1 =
∑
q
λr,q ∀r
FIr,q = κr,qK¯r + λr,qL¯r ∀(r, q).
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B Member state results in more detail
Table 8: Results for Austria, Belgium, and Bulgaria (annual consump-
tion expenditure of different income quintiles in Purchasing Power Standard
(pps))
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Table 9: Results for Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and
Estonia (annual consumption expenditure of different income quintiles in
pps)
overall q1 q2 q3 q4 q5
HRV NoPolicy 9’632 6’345 8’609 9’724 10’674 12’776
Cap -0.54% -0.61% -0.52% -0.44% -0.40% -0.71%
Cap+RES -0.53% -0.90% -0.56% -0.44% -0.34% -0.51%
Invest -0.93% -1.50% -0.95% -0.76% -0.62% -0.95%
Invest+RES -0.75% -1.38% -0.80% -0.61% -0.46% -0.64%
TaxCap -0.55% 0.55% -0.33% -0.63% -0.88% -1.13%
TaxCap+RES -0.54% 0.27% -0.37% -0.62% -0.81% -0.93%
NoPolicy - pl 9’632 6’345 8’606 9’722 10’673 12’783
Cap - pl -0.54% -0.58% -0.44% -0.40% -0.39% -0.87%
CYP NoPolicy 24’166 13’349 19’885 24’315 26’924 36’521
Cap -0.90% -0.92% -0.66% -0.56% -0.66% -1.46%
Cap+RES -0.86% -1.23% -0.80% -0.69% -0.60% -1.04%
Invest -1.47% -1.97% -1.30% -1.14% -1.04% -1.87%
Invest+RES -1.17% -1.79% -1.14% -1.00% -0.81% -1.27%
TaxCap -0.90% -0.03% -0.63% -0.53% -1.06% -1.65%
TaxCap+RES -0.86% -0.32% -0.76% -0.66% -1.01% -1.23%
NoPolicy - pl 24’166 13’349 19’885 24’315 26’924 36’520
Cap - pl -0.90% -0.84% -0.64% -0.56% -0.68% -1.50%
CZE NoPolicy 8’334 6’006 7’431 8’253 9’044 10’966
Cap 0.49% 2.00% 0.77% 0.34% 0.17% -0.63%
Cap+RES 0.29% 1.03% 0.41% 0.18% 0.12% -0.22%
Invest -1.33% -1.50% -1.15% -0.98% -1.13% -1.82%
Invest+RES -0.71% -0.88% -0.64% -0.54% -0.58% -0.88%
TaxCap 0.49% 2.20% 0.79% 0.28% 0.09% -0.71%
TaxCap+RES 0.29% 1.24% 0.42% 0.13% 0.05% -0.30%
NoPolicy - pl 8’334 6’003 7’430 8’253 9’045 10’971
Cap - pl 0.49% 2.01% 0.77% 0.34% 0.17% -0.64%
DNK NoPolicy 19’212 14’032 16’877 19’142 21’091 24’938
Cap -0.66% -1.01% -0.77% -0.62% -0.43% -0.53%
Cap+RES -1.02% -1.46% -1.13% -0.98% -0.76% -0.81%
Invest -0.91% -1.51% -1.07% -0.84% -0.55% -0.64%
Invest+RES -1.15% -1.73% -1.29% -1.10% -0.83% -0.87%
TaxCap -0.66% -0.57% -0.66% -0.66% -0.64% -0.78%
TaxCap+RES -1.02% -1.02% -1.01% -1.02% -0.97% -1.06%
NoPolicy - pl 19’212 14’032 16’877 19’142 21’092 24’939
Cap - pl -0.66% -0.77% -0.60% -0.56% -0.50% -0.88%
EST NoPolicy 6’768 3’930 5’462 5’745 7’710 11’021
Cap -0.12% 3.43% 1.05% 0.24% -0.52% -2.57%
Cap+RES -0.18% 1.70% 0.48% 0.08% -0.36% -1.57%
Invest -3.07% -3.00% -2.57% -2.27% -2.65% -4.21%
Invest+RES -1.80% -1.82% -1.50% -1.28% -1.53% -2.49%
TaxCap -0.12% 3.72% 1.17% 0.25% -0.61% -2.74%
TaxCap+RES -0.18% 1.99% 0.60% 0.09% -0.45% -1.74%
NoPolicy - pl 6’768 3’922 5’457 5’745 7’711 11’037
Cap - pl -0.12% 3.69% 1.17% 0.24% -0.53% -2.77%
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Table 10: Results for Finland, France, Germany, Greece, and Hungary (an-
nual consumption expenditure of different income quintiles in pps)
overall q1 q2 q3 q4 q5
FIN NoPolicy 18’114 11’250 14’897 17’669 20’319 26’461
Cap -0.34% -0.23% -0.25% -0.27% -0.35% -0.54%
Cap+RES -0.30% -0.40% -0.30% -0.25% -0.24% -0.30%
Invest -0.71% -0.96% -0.74% -0.62% -0.62% -0.69%
Invest+RES -0.50% -0.80% -0.57% -0.44% -0.39% -0.39%
TaxCap -0.34% 0.09% -0.12% -0.29% -0.48% -0.72%
TaxCap+RES -0.30% -0.08% -0.17% -0.27% -0.37% -0.48%
NoPolicy - pl 18’114 11’246 14’891 17’665 20’322 26’477
Cap - pl -0.34% -0.27% -0.29% -0.30% -0.33% -0.46%
FRA NoPolicy 18’100 12’031 15’116 17’253 20’029 26’081
Cap -0.09% -0.26% -0.14% -0.10% -0.05% 0.01%
Cap+RES -0.14% -0.39% -0.21% -0.15% -0.07% 0.02%
Invest -0.20% -0.49% -0.27% -0.20% -0.10% -0.04%
Invest+RES -0.19% -0.51% -0.28% -0.20% -0.10% 0.00%
TaxCap -0.09% 0.02% -0.09% -0.12% -0.16% -0.10%
TaxCap+RES -0.14% -0.10% -0.16% -0.18% -0.18% -0.08%
NoPolicy - pl 18’100 12’030 15’116 17’253 20’029 26’082
Cap - pl -0.09% -0.28% -0.15% -0.11% -0.04% 0.03%
DEU NoPolicy 19’247 11’313 15’545 18’544 21’441 29’411
Cap -0.13% 0.01% -0.09% -0.13% -0.15% -0.23%
Cap+RES -0.13% -0.24% -0.08% -0.07% -0.13% -0.17%
Invest -0.41% -0.64% -0.45% -0.36% -0.32% -0.37%
Invest+RES -0.29% -0.60% -0.28% -0.19% -0.22% -0.25%
TaxCap -0.13% 0.44% -0.03% -0.22% -0.28% -0.34%
TaxCap+RES -0.14% 0.21% -0.02% -0.16% -0.27% -0.29%
NoPolicy - pl 19’247 11’312 15’541 18’540 21’442 29’421
Cap - pl -0.13% 0.02% -0.07% -0.12% -0.15% -0.26%
GRC NoPolicy 17’073 10’704 12’471 15’311 18’571 28’331
Cap -1.09% -1.42% -1.15% -0.97% -1.01% -1.02%
Cap+RES -1.12% -1.85% -1.29% -0.96% -1.02% -0.86%
Invest -1.62% -2.65% -1.82% -1.35% -1.45% -1.28%
Invest+RES -1.41% -2.52% -1.66% -1.17% -1.26% -1.00%
TaxCap -1.09% 1.82% -0.46% -1.57% -1.59% -2.17%
TaxCap+RES -1.12% 1.47% -0.58% -1.57% -1.61% -2.04%
NoPolicy - pl 17’073 10’701 12’470 15’311 18’571 28’337
Cap - pl -1.09% -1.46% -1.17% -0.97% -1.01% -0.99%
HUN NoPolicy 6’833 5’205 5’927 6’569 7’376 9’097
Cap 0.15% 0.43% 0.23% 0.13% 0.10% -0.06%
Cap+RES 0.05% 0.13% 0.08% 0.06% 0.04% -0.02%
Invest -0.37% -0.50% -0.36% -0.28% -0.31% -0.41%
Invest+RES -0.23% -0.38% -0.25% -0.17% -0.18% -0.21%
TaxCap 0.15% 0.68% 0.28% 0.05% 0.02% -0.17%
TaxCap+RES 0.05% 0.38% 0.13% -0.02% -0.04% -0.13%
NoPolicy - pl 6’833 5’204 5’927 6’569 7’376 9’098
Cap - pl 0.15% 0.45% 0.24% 0.13% 0.10% -0.09%
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Table 11: Results for Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, and Luxembourg
(annual consumption expenditure of different income quintiles in pps)
overall q1 q2 q3 q4 q5
IRL NoPolicy 18’969 14’588 15’660 17’502 21’090 26’015
Cap -0.17% -0.19% -0.17% -0.15% -0.13% -0.22%
Cap+RES -0.14% -0.26% -0.16% -0.12% -0.07% -0.10%
Invest -0.39% -0.61% -0.43% -0.35% -0.25% -0.34%
Invest+RES -0.25% -0.49% -0.31% -0.23% -0.13% -0.16%
TaxCap -0.17% 0.15% -0.12% -0.20% -0.28% -0.34%
TaxCap+RES -0.14% 0.08% -0.11% -0.17% -0.22% -0.23%
NoPolicy - pl 18’969 14’584 15’653 17’499 21’091 26’030
Cap - pl -0.17% -0.17% -0.15% -0.14% -0.13% -0.25%
ITA NoPolicy 17’971 11’390 14’387 16’860 19’722 27’495
Cap -0.41% -0.47% -0.36% -0.35% -0.39% -0.45%
Cap+RES -0.34% -0.52% -0.32% -0.29% -0.33% -0.34%
Invest -0.64% -0.90% -0.60% -0.55% -0.61% -0.64%
Invest+RES -0.47% -0.75% -0.46% -0.39% -0.45% -0.44%
TaxCap -0.41% -0.12% -0.35% -0.43% -0.43% -0.52%
TaxCap+RES -0.35% -0.16% -0.31% -0.36% -0.37% -0.40%
NoPolicy - pl 17’971 11’388 14’385 16’859 19’722 27’500
Cap - pl -0.41% -0.51% -0.38% -0.36% -0.39% -0.42%
LVA NoPolicy 6’876 4’527 5’614 6’138 7’362 10’710
Cap -0.15% -0.13% -0.16% -0.18% -0.15% -0.13%
Cap+RES -0.14% -0.33% -0.24% -0.19% -0.12% 0.07%
Invest -0.67% -1.16% -0.77% -0.56% -0.54% -0.50%
Invest+RES -0.42% -0.89% -0.57% -0.40% -0.33% -0.14%
TaxCap -0.15% 0.56% 0.05% -0.24% -0.36% -0.47%
TaxCap+RES -0.14% 0.37% -0.03% -0.25% -0.33% -0.29%
NoPolicy - pl 6’876 4’524 5’613 6’138 7’362 10’714
Cap - pl -0.15% -0.18% -0.18% -0.18% -0.15% -0.09%
LTU NoPolicy 8’672 5’872 7’294 8’449 9’529 12’227
Cap 0.08% 0.61% 0.24% 0.05% 0.00% -0.29%
Cap+RES 0.16% 0.32% 0.18% 0.10% 0.12% 0.13%
Invest -0.76% -0.95% -0.72% -0.60% -0.66% -0.89%
Invest+RES -0.30% -0.53% -0.35% -0.25% -0.24% -0.20%
TaxCap 0.08% 0.92% 0.34% -0.02% -0.09% -0.43%
TaxCap+RES 0.16% 0.64% 0.27% 0.03% 0.03% -0.02%
NoPolicy - pl 8’672 5’871 7’293 8’450 9’529 12’229
Cap - pl 0.08% 0.59% 0.24% 0.05% 0.00% -0.27%
LUX NoPolicy 32’582 17’833 24’567 29’597 37’762 53’131
Cap -0.46% -0.86% -0.59% -0.44% -0.33% -0.30%
Cap+RES -0.53% -1.05% -0.71% -0.52% -0.37% -0.32%
Invest -0.65% -1.27% -0.86% -0.63% -0.46% -0.39%
Invest+RES -0.63% -1.27% -0.86% -0.63% -0.44% -0.37%
TaxCap -0.45% -0.20% -0.44% -0.54% -0.52% -0.48%
TaxCap+RES -0.53% -0.39% -0.56% -0.62% -0.56% -0.50%
NoPolicy - pl 32’582 17’831 24’565 29’596 37’760 53’139
Cap - pl -0.45% -0.85% -0.58% -0.43% -0.32% -0.33%
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Table 12: Results for Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Roma-
nia (annual consumption expenditure of different income quintiles in pps)
overall q1 q2 q3 q4 q5
MLT NoPolicy 14’620 10’722 12’649 14’855 16’069 18’819
Cap -2.06% -2.43% -2.16% -1.83% -1.80% -2.13%
Cap+RES -2.15% -2.94% -2.37% -1.86% -1.77% -1.96%
Invest -2.75% -3.87% -2.98% -2.31% -2.21% -2.56%
Invest+RES -2.46% -3.59% -2.74% -2.08% -1.96% -2.15%
TaxCap -2.05% 2.03% -1.29% -2.86% -3.45% -3.86%
TaxCap+RES -2.14% 1.53% -1.50% -2.90% -3.43% -3.69%
NoPolicy - pl 14’620 10’722 12’648 14’855 16’069 18’820
Cap - pl -2.07% -2.45% -2.17% -1.83% -1.80% -2.13%
NLD NoPolicy 20’037 16’606 17’834 19’576 20’709 25’403
Cap -0.57% -0.57% -0.61% -0.52% -0.52% -0.61%
Cap+RES -0.63% -0.80% -0.70% -0.56% -0.52% -0.57%
Invest -0.80% -1.04% -0.89% -0.69% -0.64% -0.72%
Invest+RES -0.76% -1.06% -0.86% -0.65% -0.58% -0.63%
TaxCap -0.57% -0.26% -0.56% -0.61% -0.67% -0.74%
TaxCap+RES -0.63% -0.47% -0.65% -0.65% -0.67% -0.71%
NoPolicy - pl 20’037 16’604 17’831 19’575 20’709 25’411
Cap - pl -0.57% -0.52% -0.52% -0.50% -0.53% -0.76%
POL NoPolicy 10’581 7’843 9’196 9’792 11’043 15’055
Cap -0.54% 0.57% -0.17% -0.49% -0.69% -1.52%
Cap+RES -0.33% 0.20% -0.14% -0.28% -0.39% -0.85%
Invest -2.00% -2.06% -1.82% -1.65% -1.84% -2.47%
Invest+RES -1.13% -1.23% -1.05% -0.92% -1.02% -1.37%
TaxCap -0.54% 0.78% -0.12% -0.54% -0.76% -1.62%
TaxCap+RES -0.34% 0.41% -0.10% -0.33% -0.46% -0.94%
NoPolicy - pl 10’581 7’835 9’193 9’793 11’045 15’067
Cap - pl -0.54% 0.74% -0.11% -0.51% -0.72% -1.65%
PRT NoPolicy 13’589 8’002 10’473 12’482 14’575 22’429
Cap -0.36% -0.41% -0.39% -0.35% -0.32% -0.35%
Cap+RES -0.36% -0.48% -0.47% -0.42% -0.32% -0.24%
Invest -0.76% -0.94% -0.94% -0.86% -0.69% -0.56%
Invest+RES -0.58% -0.76% -0.77% -0.70% -0.52% -0.36%
TaxCap -0.36% -0.11% -0.19% -0.24% -0.41% -0.60%
TaxCap+RES -0.36% -0.18% -0.27% -0.31% -0.42% -0.49%
NoPolicy - pl 13’589 8’000 10’471 12’482 14’576 22’434
Cap - pl -0.36% -0.36% -0.36% -0.35% -0.33% -0.39%
ROU NoPolicy 5’389 3’262 4’394 5’186 6’024 8’091
Cap 0.97% 3.32% 1.46% 0.71% 0.58% -0.06%
Cap+RES 0.47% 1.76% 0.75% 0.37% 0.27% -0.13%
Invest -0.90% -0.65% -0.73% -0.74% -0.85% -1.29%
Invest+RES -0.55% -0.41% -0.46% -0.42% -0.51% -0.81%
TaxCap 0.97% 4.03% 1.68% 0.66% 0.42% -0.42%
TaxCap+RES 0.48% 2.44% 0.96% 0.32% 0.12% -0.47%
NoPolicy - pl 5’389 3’260 4’392 5’186 6’025 8’096
Cap - pl 0.97% 3.30% 1.45% 0.71% 0.58% -0.05%
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Table 13: Results for Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom (annual consumption expenditure of different income quintiles in
pps)
overall q1 q2 q3 q4 q5
SVK NoPolicy 8’322 6’817 7’514 7’870 8’529 10’889
Cap 0.84% 1.61% 0.87% 0.73% 0.50% 0.43%
Cap+RES 0.52% 0.91% 0.52% 0.45% 0.33% 0.38%
Invest -0.11% -0.22% -0.14% -0.12% -0.08% -0.01%
Invest+RES 0.01% -0.09% -0.04% -0.02% 0.02% 0.14%
TaxCap 0.84% 1.76% 0.89% 0.70% 0.44% 0.34%
TaxCap+RES 0.52% 1.06% 0.53% 0.42% 0.27% 0.30%
NoPolicy - pl 8’322 6’816 7’514 7’870 8’529 10’891
Cap - pl 0.84% 1.56% 0.87% 0.73% 0.52% 0.47%
SVN NoPolicy 15’288 11’434 14’203 15’115 15’979 19’714
Cap -0.37% -0.40% -0.32% -0.38% -0.35% -0.42%
Cap+RES -0.41% -0.67% -0.30% -0.46% -0.29% -0.35%
Invest -0.87% -1.32% -0.74% -0.98% -0.63% -0.70%
Invest+RES -0.68% -1.17% -0.53% -0.79% -0.44% -0.50%
TaxCap -0.37% 0.27% -0.44% -0.23% -0.70% -0.73%
TaxCap+RES -0.41% 0.02% -0.42% -0.32% -0.64% -0.66%
NoPolicy - pl 15’288 11’430 14’195 15’112 15’983 19’729
Cap - pl -0.38% -0.40% -0.32% -0.37% -0.35% -0.42%
ESP NoPolicy 17’878 11’196 14’498 17’204 19’845 26’659
Cap -0.20% -0.09% -0.14% -0.14% -0.17% -0.35%
Cap+RES -0.20% -0.34% -0.19% -0.17% -0.13% -0.21%
Invest -0.53% -0.89% -0.52% -0.44% -0.35% -0.57%
Invest+RES -0.38% -0.77% -0.40% -0.33% -0.24% -0.33%
TaxCap -0.20% 0.41% -0.09% -0.20% -0.33% -0.47%
TaxCap+RES -0.20% 0.17% -0.14% -0.22% -0.30% -0.33%
NoPolicy - pl 17’878 11’192 14’494 17’202 19’844 26’671
Cap - pl -0.20% -0.08% -0.13% -0.14% -0.17% -0.36%
SWE NoPolicy 19’122 13’564 16’251 19’488 21’213 25’116
Cap -0.33% -0.55% -0.36% -0.29% -0.22% -0.28%
Cap+RES -0.50% -0.78% -0.55% -0.46% -0.37% -0.41%
Invest -0.44% -0.76% -0.49% -0.38% -0.27% -0.33%
Invest+RES -0.56% -0.89% -0.62% -0.51% -0.40% -0.44%
TaxCap -0.33% -0.27% -0.28% -0.33% -0.38% -0.40%
TaxCap+RES -0.50% -0.50% -0.46% -0.51% -0.52% -0.52%
NoPolicy - pl 19’122 13’562 16’249 19’487 21’214 25’121
Cap - pl -0.33% -0.56% -0.38% -0.30% -0.22% -0.25%
GBR NoPolicy 14’786 10’677 12’038 13’712 15’611 21’903
Cap -0.09% -0.07% -0.10% -0.09% -0.06% -0.12%
Cap+RES -0.13% -0.15% -0.14% -0.12% -0.10% -0.14%
Invest -0.26% -0.39% -0.31% -0.24% -0.16% -0.21%
Invest+RES -0.22% -0.32% -0.25% -0.20% -0.16% -0.19%
TaxCap -0.09% 0.09% -0.07% -0.11% -0.12% -0.19%
TaxCap+RES -0.13% 0.03% -0.10% -0.14% -0.17% -0.21%
NoPolicy - pl 14’786 10’678 12’038 13’712 15’611 21’902
Cap - pl -0.09% 0.04% -0.01% -0.05% -0.09% -0.26%
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Table 14: ets auction revenue in million EUR for scenario Cap with an
emission cap and scenario Cap+RES with a cap and res targets.
Cap Cap+RES
(permit price: (permit price:
22.05 EUR/tCO2) 12.18 EUR/tCO2)
AUT 313.8 170.9
BEL 572.2 311.6
BGR 683.0 372.0
HRV 108.8 59.3
CYP 60.0 32.7
CZE 1054.5 574.3
DNK 281.5 153.3
EST 205.4 111.8
FIN 376.1 204.8
FRA 1234.4 672.3
DEU 4515.5 2459.2
GRC 782.2 426.0
HUN 336.9 183.5
IRL 212.3 115.6
ITA 2173.6 1183.7
LVA 46.1 25.1
LTU 122.3 66.6
LUX 39.2 21.4
MLT 23.1 12.6
NLD 756.8 412.2
POL 2817.3 1534.3
PRT 396.9 216.1
ROU 1126.0 613.2
SVK 346.1 188.5
SVN 99.2 54.0
ESP 1947.4 1060.6
SWE 200.7 109.3
GBR 2353.5 1281.8
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